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WHY NOT STRIP TO SAVE YOUR HOME? 
PROHIBITION ON CHAPTER 7 STRIP OFF 
MAKES NO CENTS FOR DEBTORS OR 
CREDITORS 
 
Brendan Buschman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A 2012 bankruptcy decision by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, In re McNeal,
1
 may have the 
answer to the current wave of homes in foreclosure. As of 
December 2012, “[a]pproximately 1.2 million [American] homes 
were in the national foreclosure inventory.”2 A home is in the 
foreclosure inventory if it is “in any stage of the foreclosure 
process.”3 Although the 2012 inventory numbers show a decline of 
19.5 percent from 2011,
4
 the 2012 foreclosure statistics are still 
much higher than foreclosure statistics from 2000 to 2006.
5
 In fact 
56,000 completed foreclosures occurred in December 2012, as 
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1
In re McNeal, 477 F. App’x 562 (11th Cir. 2012). 
2
CoreLogic Reports 767,000 Completed Foreclosures in 2012, 
CORELOGIC (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/ 
corelogic-reports-767,000-completed-foreclosures-in-2012.aspx. “CoreLogic 
(NYSE:CLGX) is a leading property information, analytics and services 
provider in the United States and Australia. The company’s combined data from 
public, contributory, and proprietary sources includes over 3.3 billion records 
spanning more than 40 years . . . .” Id.  
3
Id.  
4
Id. 
5
Id.  
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compared to an average of 21,000 completed foreclosures per 
month from 2000 to 2006.
6
 
Many homes in foreclosure are a product of irresponsible 
borrowing and irresponsible lending.
7
  During the real estate boom 
of the early 2000s, when home values were consistently increasing, 
many consumers purchased new homes or borrowed against the 
equity in their homes.
8
 Numerous borrowers had poor credit or a 
history of irresponsible financial decision-making.
9
 Lenders sold 
loans to people whom they knew or suspected had poor credit or 
financial qualifications.
10
 Further, many borrowers falsified their 
financial qualifications in order to receive loans.
11
 
Lenders had an incentive to sell as many mortgages as 
possible.
12
 Wall Street investment firms like Bear Stearns bought 
these mortgages, pooled them, and sold them to other investors.
13
 
Thus, lenders were able to pass their liability on the interest to the 
Wall Street investors. The Wall Street investors then sold those 
mortgages and passed liability onto the subsequent buyer.
14
 Once 
the borrowers began to default on the loans—loans which most 
could not afford in the first place—the final owners of the 
mortgages had a virtually worthless investment.
15
  
These defaulted mortgages destroyed the American housing 
market, which, in turn, devastated the world economy.
16
 Wall 
Street investment firms stopped buying mortgages from lenders, 
and the mortgage lending market dried up.
17
 Home prices declined 
drastically.
18
 Many homeowners saw the value of their homes drop 
                                                          
6
Id.  
7
House of Cards (CNBC television broadcast June 4, 2009). 
8
Id. 
9
Id. 
10
Id. 
11
Id. 
12
Id.  
13
Id. 
14
Id. 
15
Id. 
16
Id. 
17
Id. 
18
Id. 
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below the amount of their first mortgage.
19
  
Historically, the federal bankruptcy courts are places for 
homeowners to seek refuge from foreclosure.
20
 The filing of a 
bankruptcy petition automatically stays any foreclosure action by 
the lender until the bankruptcy case is either discharged or 
closed.
21
 A stay forces the foreclosing lender to delay any 
foreclosure sale.
22
 A bankruptcy case may also alter the rights of a 
creditor—foreclosing or not.23 A homeowner stands much to gain 
if, during his bankruptcy, he can reduce the amount of money he 
owes to a party holding a mortgage on his property.  
Two ways of reducing the amount of money owed a mortgagee 
are called strip down and strip off.
24
 The terms are not 
synonymous, but they both act upon a lien on the debtor’s 
property.
25
 In order to procure funds from a lender, a borrower 
may grant that lender a right to certain property called collateral.
26
 
That lender then holds a lien on the collateral.
27
 If the borrower 
defaults on his payments to the lender, the lien is the instrument 
                                                          
19
Id. 
20
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (staying any debt collection efforts, 
including foreclosure, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition). 
21
Id. 
22
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry 
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013), available at LexisNexis (noting that the stay 
acts as an injunction against all “legal proceedings against the debtor that were 
or could have been commenced prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case”). 
23
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2012) (explaining that a bankruptcy 
discharge removes personal liability on any judgment obtained against the 
debtor). 
24
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was the first federal 
appellate court to grant strip off to a Chapter 7 debtor in Gaglia v. First Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1311 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied Chapter 7 strip off in In re Dewsnup, 908 
F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
was the first federal appellate court to allow a Chapter 7 strip off in In re 
Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989).  
25
See Michael Myers, Dewsnup Strikes Again: Lien-Stripping of Junior 
Mortgages in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2011). 
26
See Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowery Brief: A Quantum Leap from 
Strip Down to Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 131, 135–36 (1991). 
27
Id. 
270 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
that gives the lender rights to collect on the debt.
28
 The value of a 
lien is simply the balance of the loan due the lender.
29
 To strip 
down a lien means to reduce the value of the lien to the value of 
the collateral secured.
30
 To strip off a lien means to remove the lien 
entirely from the property the lien secures.
31
 In bankruptcy, both of 
these concepts link inextricably to the value of the collateral and 
the balance due the lienholder.
32
 For example, a homeowner owns 
a home worth $150,000. Assume a lien encumbers this home; the 
homeowner gave a lender the lien as consideration for the funds to 
purchase the home. Assume the balance due the lienholder is 
$200,000. This means the lien is worth $200,000. A homeowner 
who wants to strip down a lien wants to reduce the value of the lien 
from $200,000 to $150,000. Suppose the same home has an 
additional, or junior, mortgage attached to it worth $50,000. The 
proceeds from a sale of the home satisfy the senior mortgage in full 
before they satisfy the junior mortgage at all.
33
 Thus, on our home 
worth $150,000, with a senior mortgage worth $200,000, no value 
attaches to any junior mortgage. A homeowner who tries to strip 
off a lien will ask a bankruptcy court to remove in full the lien 
attached to this junior mortgage.
34
  
Both a strip down and a strip off are favorable to a homeowner 
and unfavorable to a creditor. Each action asks the bankruptcy 
court to disrupt valid interests secured in real property. However, 
                                                          
28
Id. 
29
See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 413 (1992) (describing the 
lien as worth $120,000, the balance owed the lender when the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy). 
30
Henderson, supra note 26, at 136. 
31
See William P. Nacy, Note, Survival Underwater: Wholly-Unsecured 
Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 94 n.43 (2000) (“To 
strip off a lien is to avoid the lien in its entirety, such as when there is absolutely 
no supporting value; i.e. a junior mortgage subordinated to a senior mortgage 
which, upon foreclosure, yields nothing for distribution to the junior.”) (citing In 
re Smith, 247 B.R. 191, 196 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000)). 
32
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (splitting the claim of an under-secured 
lienholder into a secured claim and an unsecured claim based on the value of the 
collateral). 
33
See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 
LAW 819–21 (5th ed. 2007). 
34
See Nacy, supra note 31, at 94 n.43. 
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the disruption of property law is something that a bankruptcy court 
often does in order to advance its policies of (1) a fresh start for the 
debtor
35
 and (2) equality amongst creditors.
36
 
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court held in Dewsnup v. 
Timm
37
 that an individual debtor in Chapter 7 could not strip down 
a lien attached to his primary residence.
38
 The market value of the 
property covered some portion of the value of the lien.
39
 The 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
40
 and two United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals
41
 have subsequently extended the 
Dewsnup holding to prevent an individual debtor in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy from stripping off a lien held by a junior mortgagee on 
the debtor’s primary residence. These courts have incorrectly held 
that a junior lien covered by no value in the collateral, like the 
$50,000 junior lien in our example above, must remain fully intact 
on the home of a Chapter 7 debtor.
42
 
A prohibition on stripping off all junior liens could have 
disastrous results for the housing industry and the entire United 
States economy. Thousands of homeowners have multiple 
mortgages on their homes, and, as a result of depressed housing 
prices, many of these homes have at least one valueless junior lien 
attached to it.
43
 To end the housing crisis, homeowners need to be 
able to remain in their homes, and the amount of homes in 
                                                          
35
Henderson, supra note 26, at 136. 
36
See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (describing equality 
amongst creditors as “prime bankruptcy policy”) (citation omitted). 
37
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
38
Id. at 417. 
39
Id. 
40
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit denied avoidance 
of a junior lien in In re Laskin, 222 B.R. 872 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
41
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied avoidance of a junior 
lien in Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Network (In re Ryan), 253 F.3d 778 (4th 
Cir. 2001), and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied avoidance of a 
junior lien in Talbert v. City Mortgage Services (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
42
See, e.g., In re Ryan, 253 F.3d at 783. 
43
See Myers, supra note 25, at 1335 (“Th[e] steep drop in home values 
[since 2007] left many homeowners stuck with homes that have depreciated in 
value so much that their value does not even cover the debt they owe on 
principal mortgages, much less junior mortgages.”).  
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foreclosure needs to decrease.
44
 A prohibition on stripping off all 
junior liens could cause homeowners to abandon their homes, 
drastically increasing the number of foreclosures.  
 In May 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
in In re McNeal correctly held that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off 
a valueless, junior lien on his primary residence.
45
 The court held 
that the Dewsnup prohibition of stripping down a lien does not 
compel a prohibition on stripping off a valueless, junior lien.
46
  
The McNeal court reached the correct conclusion because a 
Chapter 7 debtor needs the freedom to strip off a worthless junior 
lien on his primary residence in order to retain his home. The 
freedom to strip off this worthless junior lien is a necessary policy: 
homeowners get a fresh economic start, and lienholders do not 
suffer economically because the lien being stripped off is already 
worthless.
47
 Further, the debtor’s dire need for a fresh start from 
bankruptcy outweighs the lienholder’s interest in potential future 
equity in the home. 
Part I of this note introduces consumer bankruptcy and the 
relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee that consumer 
bankruptcy necessarily alters. Part II traces the history of strip 
down in Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy, with particular attention 
paid to Dewsnup v. Timm. Part III distinguishes strip off from strip 
down and advocates for permitting strip off in Chapter 7. Part IV 
argues that the policy reasons that make strip off permissible in 
Chapter 13 bankruptcies should apply to Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  
 
  
                                                          
44
Congress has clearly noticed the need to reduce the number of homes in 
foreclosure. To that end, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008). See also R. Travis 
Santos, Comment, The Legal Way to Defeat Optimus Sub-Prime, 25 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 287 (2008). 
45
In re McNeal, 477 F. App’x 562, 564–65 (11th Cir. 2012). 
46
Id. 
47
See id. (noting that Dewsnup did not abrogate an Eleventh Circuit 
precedent case, Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 
1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989)). The Folendore court allowed strip off because it 
would help a debtor and not harm an unsecured lienholder. 862 F.2d at 1540. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
 
A. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13: The Consumer Chapters 
 
The Bankruptcy Code is a federal statute that allows both 
businesses and individual consumers to reorganize or liquidate 
under the protection of the federal judicial system.
48
 Congress has 
amended the Code many times since its first drafting in 1978; the 
most notable amendments were made in 1986, 1994, and 2005.
49
 
Each federal district has a bankruptcy court, and each federal 
district court refers its bankruptcy cases to these courts.
50
 Each 
district court hears appeals of the decisions of its bankruptcy 
court.
51
 A consumer bankruptcy case either liquidates the assets of 
the debtor in satisfaction of his debts
52
 or adjusts the debtor’s debts 
so that he may retain his assets and pay off his debts over time.
53
  
The two most common types of bankruptcy for consumers are 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
54
 Chapter 7 is called the chapter for 
“Liquidation.”55 Chapter 13 is called the chapter for “Adjustment 
of Debts of an Individual With Regular Income,”56 also known as 
reorganization.
57
 Chapter 13 enables the debtor to pay off creditors 
from the debtor’s future earnings.58 Chapter 7, on the other hand, 
requires a trustee in bankruptcy to pay off creditors from the 
                                                          
48
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012). 
49
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF 
DEBTORS & CREDITORS 104–06 (6th ed. 2009). 
50
Section 157(a) does not require district courts to refer cases to its 
bankruptcy courts, but all district courts do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012); 
see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 3.02. 
51
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 107. 
52
See 6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 700.01. 
53
See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1300.01. 
54
See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (clarifying who may be a debtor and in 
which bankruptcy chapter a debtor may file).  
55
Id. §§ 701–84. 
56
Id. §§ 1301–30. 
57
See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1300.01 (noting that a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy is not called a reorganization, but it “is in fact quite similar” to a 
Chapter 11 reorganization). 
58
See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (making regular income a 
requirement for filing a Chapter 13 case). 
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debtor’s present accumulated assets after liquidation.59 A 
successful Chapter 13 case will usually last three to five years,
60
 
whereas a typical Chapter 7 case lasts about three months.
61
 The 
Chapter 13 debtor submits to the bankruptcy court a plan as to how 
he will pay his creditors out of his future income.
62
 Every Chapter 
13 plan requires the debtor to make monthly payments for a 
minimum of three years and a maximum of five years.
63
 The 
Chapter 13 debtor receives his discharge only upon completion of 
all plan payments,
64
 but there is little required of the Chapter 7 
debtor during the bankruptcy in order to get his discharge.
65
 
 
B. The Debtor’s Affairs Pre-Bankruptcy 
 
In order to understand how bankruptcy alters the relationships 
of a debtor to his creditors, we must look at the debtor’s financial 
relationships before the bankruptcy proceeding begins. Assume a 
homeowner owns one home, which he lives in as his primary 
residence, and has other debts owed to credit card companies. In 
order to purchase the home, this hypothetical homeowner 
borrowed $200,000 from a lender. In exchange, the homeowner 
executed a promissory note to repay the $200,000 and granted a 
                                                          
59
6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 704.02[1].  
60
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2012) (defining the “applicable commitment 
period” for a debtor paying disposable income as at least 3 but no more than 5 
years). This time period generally applies to a debtor with unsecured creditors 
not being paid in full under the debtor’s plan. See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 
1300.01 (noting that an unsecured creditor whose claim is not paid in full under 
a debtor’s plan can object to plan confirmation to force the debtor to pay his 
disposable income). 
61
See Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code: The Chapter  
7 Discharge, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/ 
BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (noting that a 
Chapter 7 case is typically discharged within “60 to 90 days after the date first 
set for the meeting of creditors” prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2012)). 
62
11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322(a). 
63
Id. § 1325(b)(4). 
64
Id. § 1328(a). 
65
Id. § 727 (requiring the debtor to complete a course on personal financial 
management before the court may issue him a discharge).  
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security interest in his home to the lender.
66
 This security interest 
gave the lender a lien on the property, and it is this lien that 
enables the lender to foreclose on the home if the homeowner 
defaults on his monthly mortgage payments.
67
 Assuming there 
were no previous liens when the homeowner purchased his house, 
this lender got the first, or senior, security interest in the property.
68
 
This lien survives until the borrower pays in full the balance on the 
promissory note.
69
  
Let’s also assume that sometime after the purchase, the value 
of the home increased to $250,000. The homeowner wanted to pay 
off credit card debt or put an addition onto the home, so the 
homeowner took out a home equity loan.
70
 A lender lent the 
homeowner $50,000 and, in exchange, received a lien with a right 
to foreclose on the property if the homeowner defaults on the 
monthly payments.
71
 This lien also survives until the balance of the 
note is paid in full,
72
 but this lien is considered junior to the 
previous senior lien that was used to purchase the home.
73
 Thus, 
the junior lienholder can only receive proceeds from a sale of the 
home after the senior lienholder is satisfied in full.
74
 
This same homeowner also has three credit cards. These credit 
card companies will charge interest and fees on late payments, but, 
unlike the lienholders, they do not have a security interest in any 
                                                          
66
See 12 KARL B. HOLTZSCHUE, PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY 
§ 36.01 (2009), available at LexisNexis (introducing the process of a 
homebuyer granting a security interest to an entity which lends the money for 
the home purchase). 
67
See id. § 36.07[1][c] (“An action to foreclose must be predicated upon a 
failure of the mortgagor . . . to perform the agreement for which the mortgage 
was given as security.”).  
68
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819–21. 
69
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, at § 36.06[2][b]. 
70
See, e.g., In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 293 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
home equity loans are generally used for personal spending). 
71
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07[1][c] (“An action to 
foreclose must be predicated upon a failure of the mortgagor . . . to perform the 
agreement for which the mortgage was given as security.”). 
72
See id. § 36.06[2][b]. 
73
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819–21. 
74
Id. 
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property of the homeowner.
75
 If the homeowner defaults on any of 
the monthly payments, these credit card companies do not have the 
recourse to begin an action to seize any specific property of the 
homeowner.
76
 
In this scenario, the homeowner had previously met all his 
monthly payment obligations. However, perhaps he then lost his 
job and could not find another one quickly. Or he might habitually 
spend irresponsibly. Or perhaps he could never afford to sustain 
monthly payments on the mortgage a lender sold him. For 
whatever the reason, the homeowner defaults on his monthly 
obligations. Most people who end up in bankruptcy will have 
defaulted on all of their obligations.
77
 In the hypothetical here, the 
homeowner does not pay the senior lender on his home, the junior 
lender on his home, or the three credit card companies.  
Each lender with a security interest begins a foreclosure 
proceeding once the homeowner defaults.
78
 Those creditors 
without security interests, like the credit card companies, begin to 
make phone calls and deliver letters to the debtor’s home. 79 The 
debtor can end the harassing debt collection efforts and stay any 
initiated foreclosure proceeding by filing a bankruptcy petition.
80
 
Filing a bankruptcy petition begins the debtor’s bankruptcy case. 81 
Once the debtor receives a discharge of debts in bankruptcy,
82
 the 
                                                          
75
See, e.g., WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 223 (giving an 
example of a typical consumer credit card agreement). 
76
See id. (giving an example of a typical consumer credit card agreement); 
see also id. at 38–44 (noting the rights of secured creditors against their 
collateral). 
77
See id. at 113 (noting that most consumer debtors would need to devote 
years of annual income to paying off their debts, without having any funds 
available to live on). 
78
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07[1][c] (“An action to 
foreclose must be predicated upon a failure of the mortgagor . . . to perform the 
agreement for which the mortgage was given as security.”). 
79
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 138 (noting the debtor’s 
need for “breathing room” from debt collection attempts). 
80
Filing a petition automatically stays debt collection attempts. See 11 
U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
81
Id. § 301. 
82
A bankruptcy discharge removes personal liability on all discharged 
debts. 6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 700.05. 
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debtor has a fresh economic start.
83
 
 
C. Secured and Unsecured Claims 
 
The filing of the bankruptcy petition commences the debtor’s 
case
84
 and establishes an estate
85
 of the debtor’s property.86 The 
debtor lists his creditors on the bankruptcy petition, and, after those 
creditors receive notice of the bankruptcy, the creditors submit 
claims with the amount the debtor owes.
87
  
The creditor’s claims will either be secured or unsecured.88 The 
classification of claims depends on the nature of the claim held by 
the creditor. In our example from above, the homeowner in default 
on three credit cards has three unsecured creditors. These credit 
card companies each hold an unsecured claim in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy because none of them acquired a security interest in 
property of the debtor. However, the senior lienholder who is owed 
$200,000 does have a secured claim. This claim is secured because 
the lienholder acquired a security interest in the debtor’s home. But 
the Code ties the value of the lienholder’s interest into the 
determination of a claim’s status.89 Section 506(a)(1) states that: 
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on 
property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a 
secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in such property . . . and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such 
creditor’s interest . . . is less than the amount of 
                                                          
83 “The whole point of bankruptcy is to provide a debtor with a fresh start.” 
Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537, 1540 
(11th Cir. 1989). 
84
11 U.S.C. § 301. 
85
Id. § 541(a)(1) defines the bankruptcy estate as “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 
86
Id. § 541(a). 
87
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 502.01 (stating that one of the ways that 
a claim is allowed is when “proof of a claim is filed or deemed filed and no 
party objects”). 
88
11 U.S.C. § 506. 
89
Id. § 506(a)(1). 
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such allowed claim.
90
 
Courts have agreed that the market value of real property 
determines the value of the creditor’s interest in that property.91 
Thus, a lender with a security interest in real property has a 
secured claim only up to the value of the collateral.
92
 Any portion 
of the lender’s claim that exceeds the value of the collateral 
becomes an unsecured claim in bankruptcy.
93
 Assume that the 
home of our Chapter 7 debtor has a real market value of $150,000. 
The balance on the mortgage to the senior lienholder is $200,000. 
Therefore, under section 506(a), this senior lienholder has a 
secured claim worth $150,000 and an unsecured claim worth 
$50,000. The next section will reveal how the determination of a 
claim as secured or unsecured can dramatically impact the amount 
of payment a creditor receives. 
 
II. STRIP DOWN IN CHAPTER 7 
 
A. Payout to Creditors and Discharge 
 
Once a Chapter 7 case begins, “[a] [t]rustee in [b]ankruptcy . . . 
is appointed to gather all of the debtor’s property, to sell it, and to 
distribute the proceeds to creditors.”94  In our example, and in 
virtually all Chapter 7 cases, the trustee will not be able to gather 
and sell enough property to satisfy in full the claims of all 
                                                          
90
Id. (alteration in original). 
91
See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1308 
(3d Cir. 1989). Section 506(a)(2) dictates using replacement value for personal 
property for an individual debtor in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, but it does not 
dictate that replacement value be used for a Chapter 7 debtor’s real property. See 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2012). The Code still remains ambiguous as to which 
exact market value is used for a Chapter 7 debtor’s real property. See 4 COLLIER, 
supra note 22, ¶ 506.03[6]. 
92
See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1308 
(3d Cir. 1989) (noting that the under-secured lien is, under section 506(a), a 
secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim in the 
amount that exceeds the value of the collateral). 
93
See, e.g., id. (noting that the under-secured lien is, under section 506(a), 
a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim in the 
amount that exceeds the value of the collateral).  
94
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 141. 
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creditors.
95
 In fact, general unsecured creditors will often receive 
nothing in Chapter 7 individual bankruptcies.
96
 Here, the debtor’s 
home is worth $150,000 and two mortgages—–whose aggregate 
value is $250,000–—encumber the home. The trustee will not look 
to market and sell this home.
97
 This is because the secured 
creditors must be satisfied before any sale proceeds can be used to 
satisfy the unsecured creditors, and selling the home at market 
value will not even satisfy the senior lienholder.
98
 And if the senior 
lienholder is not satisfied in full, the unsecured creditors will get 
nothing from the sale of the house.
99
 Thus, the trustee will not sell 
the home.
100
 
Even if our debtor’s home is not sold, the Chapter 7 debtor will 
receive a discharge of his debts within a few months of filing.
101
 
Discharge eliminates from the debtor all personal liability for 
secured and unsecured debts.
102
 The removal of personal liability 
means that no creditor—secured or unsecured—can sue the debtor 
                                                          
95
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 507.02 (“Many bankruptcy cases do not 
generate sufficient proceeds to pay in full all claims entitled to payment in the 
case.”). 
96
Section 726 governs the distribution of a Chapter 7 estate. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 726. Section 726 distributes first to priority claims, as defined by section 507, 
in full before the general unsecured creditors receive any distribution from the 
estate. Id. § 726(a)(6). At the very bottom of the distribution ladder is the debtor. 
Id. For the types of claims given priority, see id. § 507. 
97 Section 554(a) allows the trustee to “abandon any property of the estate 
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to 
the estate.” Id. § 554(a). 
98
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 113 (noting that 
“mortgages and security interests” on the homes of many debtors disable his 
ability to pay creditors from the home’s sale). 
99
See id. at 141. 
100
Section 554(a) allows the trustee to “abandon any property of the estate 
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to 
the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
101
See Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 61. 
102
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[1] (noting that “any judgment  
on a discharged debt is void” because the discharge has removed the debtor’s 
personal liability). Section 524(a)(2) bars creditors from any actions to collect 
on a debt incurred before the debtor filed his prepetition. See 11 U.S.C. § 
524(a)(2). 
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for the debt.
103
 Note that unsecured creditors—like the three credit 
card companies whom our debtor owes—had acquired only 
personal liability against our debtor. For these creditors, 
bankruptcy discharge erases any ability to recover on a debt.
104
 
However, secured creditors acquired not just in personam rights 
against the debtor, but also in rem rights against collateral when 
the debtor was in default.
105
 For these creditors, the in personam 
rights are extinguished but the in rem rights in the property itself 
remain, even after the discharge.
106
 Thus, after the bankruptcy, the 
secured creditor may still enforce its rights “against the 
collateral . . . even though the debtor cannot be sued for any 
deficiency.”107 A secured creditor may enforce these in rem rights 
once the bankruptcy case closes, which lifts the stay on debt 
collection efforts.
108
 
A secured creditor asserts its rights over real property through 
foreclosure.
109
 Foreclosure is a legal action.
110
 The foreclosing 
lienholder files a complaint in state court, usually in the 
                                                          
103
See 6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 700.05. 
104
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 229–30. If a debtor is only 
personally liable to a creditor, as is the case in a credit card relationship, removal 
of personal liability removes any way for the creditor to collect on the debt. See 
id. at 223. 
105
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07[1][a] (noting that a court 
has in rem jurisdiction over land within its jurisdiction because of the creditor’s 
in rem rights); see also id. § 36.07 (pointing out that a lienholder has a 
deficiency judgment against the debtor for the amount to which the unpaid 
balance due the lienholder exceeds the price of the collateral at the foreclosure 
sale). 
106
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[1] (relying on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 82–83 (1991), 
when claiming that “the right to foreclose on a lien survives or passes through 
bankruptcy unaffected by the discharge”). For a scathing criticism of protecting 
a secured creditor’s in rem rights in bankruptcy, see Margaret Howard, Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy: An Essay on Missing the Point, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 313, 
322 (1994) [hereinafter Howard, Secured Claims] (arguing that the secured 
creditor in bankruptcy is entitled to the value of its collateral and nothing more). 
107
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 262. 
108
4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[1]. 
109
12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07. 
110
Id. § 36.07[1][a]. 
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jurisdiction of the property’s location.111 The lienholder will then 
schedule a foreclosure sale of the property.
112
 Usually, the only 
party to bid on the property at this sale will be the lienholder 
itself.
113
 The price fetched at a foreclosure sale may be below the 
market value of the home.
114
 In the case of our debtor, this means 
that the home with a market value of $150,000 may sell for less at 
the foreclosure sale. Thus, if the senior lienholder forecloses on 
that property, the lender sustains a loss of at least $50,000. 
A foreclosing lienholder usually can obtain a judgment against 
the homeowner for the difference between the balance due the 
lienholder and the amount of the foreclosure sale price.
115
 
However, after a bankruptcy discharge, the lienholder cannot 
obtain this judgment against the debtor because the discharge has 
removed the debtor’s personal liability on the debt.116 
 
B. Reaffirmation as an Alternative to Discharge 
 
Often, a debtor does not receive discharge of all of his debts.
117
 
The Code has provisions to prevent certain debts from being 
discharged. The list of nondischargeable debts includes federal 
student loans,
118
 any debt incurred through fraud by the debtor,
119
 
and debts owed to the government,
120
among others.
121
 Also, a 
debtor may decide to reaffirm a debt to a creditor instead of 
receiving discharge of the debt.
122
  
                                                          
111
Id. 
112
Id. § 36.07.  
113
Id.   
114
See id. § 36.07[4][b] (noting that sometimes the price at a foreclosure 
sale does not “fairly recognize the value of that real estate”). 
115
Id. § 36.07. 
116
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 262–63. 
117
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012) (listing nineteen exceptions to discharge); 
see also id. § 524(c) (describing the process of reaffirmation agreements). 
118
Id. § 523(a)(8). 
119
Id. § 523(a)(2). 
120
Id. § 523(a). 
121
See id. § 523(a) (listing many other nondischargeable debts). 
122
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04 (explaining the procedures for 
reaffirming either secured or unsecured debts). 
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To understand the reasons behind reaffirmation of debt, we 
must remember that sometimes it is advantageous for both a debtor 
and creditor to continue their relationship.
123
 In our example 
above, the debtor may wish to reaffirm the debt to the credit card 
companies or the lienholders. The debtor may wish to do so 
because he has a particular interest in continuing to borrow from a 
certain credit card company. More likely, our debtor will wish to 
reach a reaffirmation agreement with the lienholders on his home. 
Reaffirmation is the only way to prevent post-bankruptcy actions 
by the lienholders to repossess the property.
124
 This is because 
reaffirmation is the only way to prevent discharge of the debts to 
the lienholders,
125
 which leaves a secured creditor’s in rem rights 
intact. Thus reaffirmation is a powerful motivator for homeowners 
eager to keep their homes.  
Reaffirmation of debt is a voluntary agreement between a 
debtor and a creditor.
126
 Reaffirmation creates a new agreement
127
 
and execution of the reaffirmation agreement waives the terms of 
the previous agreement.
128
 However, the bankruptcy court and the 
debtor’s counsel heavily scrutinize reaffirmation agreements.129  
The court will only approve a reaffirmation agreement if it finds 
                                                          
123
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 270 (noting that 
sometimes a creditor will offer “future credit” to a debtor in exchange for a 
reaffirmation agreement). A debtor may need this credit because he is “low on 
assets.” Id. at 259. 
124 That a “bankruptcy discharge [does] not prevent enforcement of valid 
liens” has been the rule since Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886). 4 COLLIER, 
supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[2][d]. This rule is not absolute, however. The Code 
provides many ways for the lien of a secured creditor to be avoided during the 
bankruptcy. Id. Long stands for the protection of all valid liens remaining after 
the bankruptcy case closes. See Howard, Secured Claims, supra note 106, at 322 
(“To cite Long for the proposition that “liens pass through bankruptcy” is simply 
wrong. [Long], more accurately, stands for the proposition that liens pass 
through bankruptcy when they are not dealt with during the case.”). 
125
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04 (describing a reaffirmation 
agreement as a “binding agreement reaffirming a debt that would otherwise be 
discharged”). 
126
Id. ¶ 524.04[1]. 
127
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 261–62. 
128
See id. 
129
See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2012). 
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that the agreement does not place an “undue hardship” on the 
debtor’s fresh start.130 The debtor and creditor must agree to the 
reaffirmation agreement before the debtor receives his 
discharge.
131
  
The debtor in our example wishes to retain his home. In order 
to reaffirm the debt, he and the senior lienholder will negotiate in 
order to come up with a new loan agreement. The lienholder incurs 
a loss if it accepts a reaffirmation agreement that pays anything 
less than $200,000, but this loss will be less than the loss of 
foreclosing on the home. The debtor will agree to reaffirm a debt 
he thinks he can pay because reaffirmation enables him to remain 
in his home. 
 
C. Section 506(d) and Strip Down 
 
A discharge is perhaps the most powerful tool available to 
provide the debtor with a fresh start. But the debtor may avail 
himself of other tools before he receives the discharge. One of 
these tools is in the bifurcation provision of section 506(a)(1) 
mentioned above, which splits the claim of an under-secured 
creditor into a secured claim and an unsecured claim, as 
determined by the market value of the collateral.
132
 Another 
provision designed to help the debtor is section 506(d), which 
states that: “To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the 
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is 
void . . . .”133 We have already noted that our senior lienholder 
holds a lien against the debtor’s home, and that this lienholder has 
a secured claim in the amount of $150,000 and an unsecured claim 
in the amount of $50,000. Section 506(d) seems to void a lien 
attached to any unsecured claim. Does section 506(d) enable our 
homeowner to void the portion of the lien attached to the $50,000 
unsecured claim? Voiding the portion of the lien attached to the 
lienholder’s unsecured claim would have the effect of reducing the 
                                                          
130
See id. § 524(c)(3)(B). 
131
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04[1] (“To be enforceable, a 
reaffirmation must be made before the granting of a discharge.”). 
132
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). 
133
Id. § 506(d). 
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value of the lien from $200,000 to $150,000. If allowed, this would 
be a strip down. 
In 1989, the Third Circuit, in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings 
and Loan Ass’n, held that the combination of section 506(a)(1) and 
section 506(d) enabled strip down of an under-secured lien.
134
 In 
that case the debtors sought to keep their home, which had a 
market value of $34,000.
135
 A senior mortgage on the property had 
a value of $28,873.50. Unlike our example, where the senior 
mortgage is under-secured, the debtors’ senior mortgage was over-
secured because the value of the home exceeded the balance due. 
A junior mortgage on the property had “an outstanding balance of 
more than $200,000.”136 The debtors wanted to avoid any portion 
of the junior lien secured to their home which exceeded the home’s 
value.
137
 The debtors hoped to reduce the under-secured junior lien 
from over $200,000 to $5,126.50, the amount of the junior lien 
covered by the home’s market value.138 The debtors wanted to 
reaffirm the debt on that reduced amount and, thus, keep their 
home.
139
 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit allowed the strip 
down as the result of bifurcation by section 506(a)(1) and the lien-
avoidance of section 506(d).
140
 The court held that the plain 
language of section 506(d), which voids a lien “[t]o the extent that 
a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed 
secured claim,”141 voids all liens attached to an unsecured claim.142 
                                                          
134
The court held that the unsecured portion of the under-secured claim 
was an unsecured claim and, thus, voided by 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). See Gaglia v. 
First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1307–08 (3d. Cir. 1989). 
135
Id. 
136
Id. at 1305. The debtors had taken out a small business loan and granted 
the lender this large junior lien on their home as security. Id. 
137
Id. 
138
Id. 
139
Id. at 1308 (“While the [lienholder] is no worse off than if the property 
were sold, the Gaglias may realize significant benefits from lien avoidance. 
They may be better able to negotiate a repayment schedule with the [lienholder] 
for the reduced amount of the secured claim. Thus, they have an increased 
chance to retain their homestead.”). 
140
Id. at 1308–09.  
141
Id. at 1306 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1985)). 
142
Id. (construing 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1985)). 
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Additionally, under section 506(a)(1), the unsecured portion of the 
debt became an unsecured claim. Therefore, section 506(d) voided 
the lien attached to that claim since that lien was now unsecured.
143
 
The court also reasoned that a strip down in this instance would not 
harm the under-secured lienholder.
144
 If there were no strip down 
and the lien remained intact, the debtor would not be able to 
reaffirm the debt, and the under-secured lienholder would have the 
right to foreclose on its $200,000 lien after the bankruptcy.
145
 
However, a liquidation sale on that lien would only bring the 
lienholder $5,126.50 if the property sold at market value, which is 
the same amount the under-secured lienholder would receive after 
the strip down.
146
 Thus, the court reasoned that stripping down a 
lien to the value of the collateral would enable the debtors to keep 
their home and would not harm the under-secured lienholder.
147
  
 
D. Dewsnup v. Timm 
 
The United States Supreme Court “stunned the bankruptcy 
community”148 when, in 1992, it abrogated Gaglia and prohibited 
strip down of an under-secured lien in Dewsnup v. Timm.
149
 In 
Dewsnup, the debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition in the Bankruptcy 
Court, District of Utah, in 1984.
150
 The debtors owned two parcels 
of Utah farmland secured by a lien worth $120,000
151
 but defaulted 
on their mortgage payments in 1979.
152
 In 1987, the debtors filed 
an adversary proceeding
153
 seeking to reduce the value of the lien 
                                                          
143
Id. 
144
See id. at 1308 (pointing out that allowing a strip down “place[s] [the 
lender] in the same position as if the property had been liquidated”). 
145
Id. 
146
Id. 
147
Id. 
148
David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 13 (1996). 
149
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1992). 
150
Id. at 413. 
151
Id. at 410. 
152
Id. at 412. 
153
There are many types of adversary proceedings in a bankruptcy case. 
One type is “a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien . 
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attaching to the two parcels of farmland.
154
 The bankruptcy court 
determined that the fair market value of the debtors’ home was 
$39,000.
155
 Thus, the debtors sought to reduce the value of the lien 
to $39,000 and then redeem
156
 the property by paying the creditor 
$39,000.
157
 The debtors made the same argument that had 
succeeded in Gaglia: section 506(a)(1) bifurcated the lienholder’s 
claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim, and section 
506(d) voided the lien attached to the unsecured claim.
158
   
The bankruptcy court denied the debtors’ request for relief.159 
The court assumed that the trustee had abandoned the property
160
 
and concluded that section 506(d)’s avoidance power did not apply 
because abandoned property is not “an allowed, secured claim.”161 
The bankruptcy court also reasoned that use of section 506(d) to 
avoid the unsecured portion of a mortgage would be “unfair and 
inequitable.”162 The court insisted upon examining section 506(d) 
in light of the entire Bankruptcy Code and not in isolation.
163
 The 
district court affirmed without a supporting opinion.
164
 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s decision.165 The court stated that the 
                                                          
. . .” FED. R. BANKR. PRO. 7001(2). 
154
In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676, 677 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988). 
155
Id. 
156
Redeeming real property is no longer an option for a Chapter 7 debtor. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2012) (restricting the right of redemption to personal 
property). Now a Chapter 7 debtor would have to reaffirm the debt in order to 
retain his home. See id. § 524(c); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04. 
157
In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 677. 
158
Id. 
159
Id. at 683. 
160 The term “abandoned property” has nothing to do with whether the 
debtor lives on the property. Abandoned property is property that the Chapter 7 
trustee has chosen not to seize and sell to benefit the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554. 
Here, the property was abandoned because the mortgage was under-secured and 
a sale of the property would not benefit the estate. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 
589 (10th Cir. 1990); see also In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 683. 
161
In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 683. 
162
Id. at 680. 
163
Id. at 682. 
164
In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 589. 
165
Id. at 590. 
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bankruptcy estate had no interest in abandoned property; therefore, 
section 506(a) did not apply and the lienholder’s claim could not 
be severed into a secured portion and an unsecured portion.
166
 And 
if section 506(a) did not apply, the lienholder held only a secured 
claim, and section 506(d) could not act to void any portion of a 
secured claim.
167
 The court sided with bankruptcy courts that had 
denied strip down and concluded that strip down “inequitably 
give[s] debtors in a Chapter 7 liquidation more than they would 
receive in the reorganization chapters.”168 The court recognized 
that its decision directly conflicted with the decision of the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gaglia.
169
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the circuit 
split between the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gaglia 
and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Dewsnup.
170
 To 
the debtors’ argument that section 506(d) voided the unsecured 
claim created by section 506(a)(1), the lienholder responded that 
section 506(d), which voids a lien attached to an “allowed secured 
claim,” does not void all liens attached to unsecured claims.171 
Under the lienholder’s interpretation, section 506(d) only voids the 
                                                          
166
Id. at 589. 
167
Id. 
168
Id. Although not titled as such, Chapter 13 is the consumer 
reorganization section. Congress created Chapter 13 in order to provide 
consumer debtors with regular income the ability to pay off their debts over time 
in exchange for more easily retaining their assets. See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, 
¶ 1300.02. At the time the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued this 
opinion, the Ninth and Third Circuit courts had allowed strip downs in Chapter 
13 cases. See Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 124 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (holding “(1) that the unsecured portion of the Commonwealth’s 
claim may be modified and (2) that Commonwealth’s claim was secured by 
personal property as well as by the debtor’s residence and, therefore, the anti-
modification provision of section 1322 does not apply.”); In re Hougland, 886 
F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The secured portion has special protection 
when residential real estate lending is involved. The unsecured portion does 
not.”). 
169
In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 589. 
170
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 414 (1992). The Tenth Circuit and the 
Third Circuit were the only two federal appellate courts to directly address the 
issue of strip down in Chapter 7. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 589. 
171
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415. 
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liens on claims that are not both allowed and secured.
172
 Both the 
secured and unsecured claims of this lienholder were clearly 
allowed.
173
 Thus, the lender reasoned, the lien-voiding provision of 
section 506(d) did not apply.
174
 Further, the lender stressed that 
“pre-Code bankruptcy law preserved liens” like this one.175 
In a 6-2
176
 decision, the Court found for the lender.
177
 The 
Court found ambiguity in the statutory interplay of sections 506(a) 
and 506(d).
178
 The Court agreed with the lender’s argument that 
“liens [generally] pass through bankruptcy unaffected.”179 Further, 
the Court noted that Congress would have made clear any desire to 
depart from this rule if Congress intended such a result from the 
combination of sections 506(a) and 506(d).
180
 The Court stated that 
the entirety of the lien should “stay[] with the real property until 
                                                          
172
Id. 
173
See id. Section 502 deals with the claims allowance process. 11 U.S.C. § 
502 (2012). The Code defines “claim” as “right to payment.” Id. § 101(5)(A). 
For the secured creditor in Dewsnup, no issue existed as to the lender’s right to 
payment. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415. 
174
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415. 
175
Id. at 416. This quote refers, inter alia, to the rule in Long v. Bullard, 
117 U.S. 617, 621 (1886), protecting the rights of secured creditors to enforce 
their lien after the bankruptcy case closes. See also 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 
524.02[2][d] (“The bankruptcy discharge will not prevent enforcement of valid 
liens.”). 
176
Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision. See Dewsnup, 502 
U.S. at 410. 
177
Id. at 417. 
178
Id. The Court noted that liens attached to claims that were not allowed 
were voided by 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). Id. at 415–16. Such a conclusion, however, 
makes section 506(d) superfluous because “we do not need [section] 506(d) to 
tell us that a lien is dead if it secures a claim disallowed under [section] 502(b).” 
Carlson, supra note 148, at 5. 
179
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417. This statement by the Court ignores the 
powers of the Code which can affect liens in many ways. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) 
(the so-called strong arm clause that avoids unperfected security interests); id. § 
1325(a)(5)(B) (the cramdown provision that allows a Chapter 13 debtor to strip 
down the value of a lien to the value of the collateral securing it); see also 
Howard, Secured Claims, supra note 106, at 322. But see 11 U.S.C. § 
1322(b)(2) (excepts a home mortgage from cramdown). 
180
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420. 
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the foreclosure,”181 because the mortgagor and the mortgagee had 
agreed to just that.
182
 In addition, the Court reasoned that a 
reduction of the value of the lien based on a judicial valuation of 
the home’s market value at the time of the filing of the petition 
would act to “freeze” the value of the lien so as to deprive the 
lienholder of any post-petition increase in home value.
183
 The 
Court stated that a strip down of the lien would impermissibly 
endow the debtor with a “windfall” of any post-bankruptcy 
increase in the home’s value.184 Finally, the Court expressed that 
its holding was limited to these facts.
185
 
Dissenting Justice Scalia argued that the plain language of 
sections 506(a)(1) and 506(d) should allow the debtors to strip 
down the value of the mortgage on their home.
186
 Justice Scalia 
urged that the term “allowed claim” in section 506(a)(1) clearly 
had the same meaning as the term “allowed secured claim” in 
section 506(d).
187
 With these two provisions referring to the same 
type of claim, section 506(d) should void a lien attached to any 
claim identified by section 506(a) as allowed, but not secured.
188
 
Justice Souter joined the dissent.
189
 
As stated in Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Dewsnup opinion 
struggled with the language of sections 506(a) and 506(d).
190
 How 
could one phrase, “allowed secured claim” mean something 
different in section 506(a) from what it meant in section 506(d)?
191
 
                                                          
181
Id. at 417. 
182
Id. at 417–18. 
183
Id. at 417. 
184
Id. 
185
Id. at 416–17. 
186
Id. at 420–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187
Id. at 421–22. As one commentator puts it, the majority’s reading means 
that “the phrase ‘allowed secured claim’ in [section] 506(d) means the pre-
bifurcation claim of an undersecured party, even while the same phrase means 
the post-bifurcation claim when used in [section] 506(a).” Carlson, supra note 
148, at 13, 1. 
188
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
189
Id. at 420. 
190
Carlson, supra note 148, at 13–14. 
191
Id.  
290 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
The bankruptcy world was “stunned.”192 
 
III.  STRIP OFF DIFFERS FROM STRIP DOWN 
 
A. The Unsecured Lienholder Has Nothing to Gain 
 
Under Dewsnup, which is still good law, the debtor in our 
example cannot strip down the senior lien on his home from 
$200,000 to $150,000, the home’s market value. But what is 
unclear is how, if at all, this prohibition of strip down affects strip 
off of the junior lienholder. 
The position of the senior lienholder—both before and after a 
debtor’s bankruptcy—differs from that of the junior lienholder. 
When the junior lienholder acquired its lien on the home of our 
debtor, the market value of the home was $250,000. The debtor 
borrowed the $50,000 in order to have more cash to spend as he 
saw fit. Whether the debtor wanted to make a renovation to the 
home or pay off other credit card debt, the home equity lender was 
satisfied that the junior lien on the debtor’s home provided the 
lender with sufficient security to cover the risk of default. The 
junior lienholder knew of the presence of the senior lien at the time 
the lender sold the home equity loan because it was a matter of 
public record.
193
 It was a matter of public record because the senior 
lienholder had perfected its security interest by filing its lien with a 
public office.
194
 Thus, the junior lien acquired “the property 
subject to prior encumbrances.”195 
Foreclosure differs greatly for a junior lienholder because of 
the senior lienholder’s right to foreclose. Foreclosure by a senior 
lienholder generally extinguishes the lien of the junior 
lienholder.
196
 The proceeds of the senior lienholder’s foreclosure 
sale are distributed in priority order; the senior lienholder is 
satisfied in full before the junior lienholder receives any sale 
                                                          
192
Id. at 13. 
193
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819 (“A junior mortgagee’s 
security is the property subject to prior encumbrances.”). 
194
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 41.01 (describing the process of 
recording a security interest). 
195
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819. 
196
Id. at 819–21. 
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proceeds.
197
 In the case of our debtor, a foreclosure sale by the 
senior lienholder will return proceeds of at most $150,000, the 
market value of the home. These proceeds will go entirely to the 
senior lienholder, and the junior lienholder will lose its lien and get 
nothing in return.
198
 
The presence of the senior lien also influences the decision to 
foreclose by the junior lienholder. If a junior lienholder forecloses 
on its lien and a senior lienholder does not foreclose, the junior 
lienholder sells at the foreclosure sale its subordinate position to 
the senior lien.
199
 In the case of our debtor, the foreclosing junior 
lienholder would sell a $50,000 lien, in subordinated position to a 
$200,000 lien on a home worth $150,000. Clearly, this junior lien 
would not be an attractive purchase. The foreclosing junior 
lienholder would lose its lien for nothing. Thus, the unsecured 
junior lienholder receives no return on its lien in a foreclosure sale 
whether the sale is done by the senior lienholder or the junior 
lienholder.
200
  
In 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re 
McNeal granted strip off to a debtor in a similar position to our 
debtor.
201
 There, the market value of the debtor’s home was 
$141,416.
202
 The home was subject to a senior lien worth $176,413 
and a junior lien worth $44,444.
203
 As in the case of our debtor, the 
market price of the home left the junior lien with no value in the 
collateral.
204
 The court relied on its reasoning from a pre-Dewsnup 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case,
205
 Folendore v. 
                                                          
197
See id. (describing the economically and legally advantageous position 
of the senior lienholder over the junior lienholder). 
198
See id. at 821 (a senior lienholder has priority over proceeds in a 
foreclosure sale). 
199
Id. at 819. 
200
See id. at 819–21. 
201
See In re McNeal, F. App’x 562, 563 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that the 
debtor’s home was encumbered by an under-secured lien and an unsecured lien). 
202
Id. 
203
Id. 
204
See id. (noting that the debtor’s home was encumbered by an under-
secured lien and an unsecured lien). 
205
Id. at 564–65. 
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United States Small Bus. Admin.
206
  
In 1989, the Folendore court granted a strip off for two 
reasons. First, the junior lienholder would get nothing from either 
its own foreclosure sale or the sale of the senior lienholder.
207
 
Second, strip off would help provide the debtor with a fresh start, 
which is “the whole point of bankruptcy.”208 The junior lienholder 
in Folendore was in the same position as the junior lienholder in 
McNeal and the junior lienholder in our example: the aggregate 
value of senior liens exceeded the market value of the home.
209
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the 
correct decision in Folendore and McNeal. The unsecured junior 
lien will not bring a return in a foreclosure sale, and the removal of 
the unsecured lien will enhance the debtor’s fresh start. At the very 
least, the absence of the lien means the debtor will have one less 
debt to reaffirm on his home.  
 
B. Post-Bankruptcy Increase in the Home’s Value 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Folendore examines a post-bankruptcy foreclosure sale using the 
market value of the debtor’s home during bankruptcy.210 The 
bankruptcy’s market value of the property is the appropriate 
measure of the impact of foreclosure on the junior lienholder if the 
market value remains the same. If the foreclosure sale by either the 
senior or junior lienholder closely follows the bankruptcy, the 
home will most likely have the same market value. But what if the 
foreclosure sale happens long enough after the bankruptcy that the 
property’s value increases enough that the junior lienholder gets 
some value for its lien? 
The possibility of a post-bankruptcy increase in the home’s 
value situation concerned the Dewsnup Court.
211
 The Court stated 
                                                          
206
In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989). 
207
See id. at 1540. 
208
Id. 
209
Id. at 1538. 
210
See id. at 1540 (noting the power of the senior lienholder to “foreclose 
and annihilate” the junior lien because no value in the home covered the junior 
lien). 
211
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417–18 (1992). 
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that a strip down based on the market value at the time of the 
bankruptcy impermissibly acted to “freeze” the value of the 
collateral.
212
 In other words, stripping down a lien to the market 
value would prevent the under-secured creditor from securing any 
future increase in the property value.
213
 In the case of our debtor, if 
he could strip down the senior lien to $150,000, the senior 
lienholder would hold a lien valued at $150,000. If the value of the 
home increased post-bankruptcy to $175,000, the senior lienholder 
would not get any of the new value of the home. Thus, the Court 
found it unfair to deprive the under-secured lienholder of its 
chance at this increase in the home’s value by stripping down its 
lien.
214
 
In 1998, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit 
held in In re Laskin that a Chapter 7 strip off was impermissible 
because a strip off would deprive a junior lienholder of an increase 
in the value of the collateral.
215
 In so holding, the court extended 
the Dewsnup prohibition of strip down, which affects an under-
secured creditor,
216
 to prohibit strip off, which affects an unsecured 
creditor.
217
 In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Network,
218
 denied Chapter 7 
strip off for the same reasons as those relied on in In re Laskin.
219
 
In 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In re Talbert 
also denied Chapter 7 strip off in order to protect the possibility of 
future value for the unsecured lienholder.
220
  
                                                          
212
Id. at 417. 
213
Id. 
214
Id. at 417–18. 
215
In re Laskin, 22 B.R. 872, 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
216
Id. at 874. 
217
Id. at 876. 
218
Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network (In re Ryan), 253 F.3d 778 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
219
See id. at 783 (summarizing the case law that holds that protecting the 
lienholder’s interest post-bankruptcy applies to a strip off situation). 
220
See Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 560 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court’s reasoning for not permitting ‘strip downs’ in 
the Chapter 7 context applies with equal validity to a debtor’s attempt to 
effectuate a Chapter 7 ‘strip off.’”) (citing In re Ryan, 253 F.3d at 782); see also 
id. at 561–62 (“Section 506 was intended to facilitate valuation and disposition 
of property in the reorganization chapters of the Code, not to confer an 
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The decisions of the Laskin, Ryan, and Talbert courts treat the 
under-secured lienholder’s chance at future value as equal to the 
unsecured lienholder’s chance, but as a practical matter they are 
not equal. Consider the case of our debtor. The under-secured 
lienholder is owed $200,000. The home is worth $150,000. The 
junior unsecured lienholder is owed $50,000. In order for the 
under-secured lien to increase in value, the home must only go up 
by $1! An increase of $5,000 in the home’s value would be 
significant to the under-secured creditor. But look at the unsecured 
junior lienholder. In order for this lien to have any value, the 
home’s value must increase by $50,001, beyond the full value of 
the under-secured lienholder. Thus, as a practical matter, the right 
of the unsecured lienholder to future value in the home is not 
equivalent to that of the senior lienholder. Therefore, courts should 
recognize the economic inequality to post-bankruptcy increase in 
the home’s value between the unsecured lienholder and the under-
secured lienholder. 
 
C. Folendore 
 
In 1989, before Dewsnup, Laskin, Ryan, and Talbert, the 
Folendore court refuted the need to protect the post-bankruptcy 
rights of an unsecured lienholder.
221
 The court noted that the junior 
lienholder wanted to preserve its unsecured lien in the hope that 
the home’s value would eventually increase enough so as to 
provide the creditor with some equity, or coverage, of this junior 
lien.
222
 The court called this argument of the junior lienholder 
“self-defeating.”223 The court pointed out that the junior lien 
remaining on the debtors’ property would, ironically, actually 
decrease the likelihood of the creditor reacquiring some equity in 
the home: the presence of the junior lien would “provide[] 
incentive for the [debtors] to abandon the property.”224 The court 
stated that:  
                                                          
additional avoiding power on a Chapter 7 debtor.”) (citation omitted) (quoting In 
re Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876). 
221
In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989). 
222
Id. 
223
Id. 
224
Id. 
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There is no reason the [debtors] should remain on a 
piece of property on which the [junior lienholder] 
can attach any equity [the debtors] manage to 
generate. [The debtors], and any other post-
discharge possessors of real property, would be far 
better off finding unencumbered property upon 
which to start their financial life afresh.
225
  
Thus, the court reasoned that preserving the unsecured junior 
lien actually dis-incentivizes a homeowner from keeping his 
home.
226
 The debtor will be financially better off if he abandons 
the home and buys a new house.
227
 
This is sound reasoning. The Folendore court understands that 
the preservation of the unsecured junior lien makes the home a less 
attractive financial investment for the debtor.
228
 The court also 
understands that the loss incurred by strip off to the junior 
lienholder is only the loss of the slim chance at future value.
229
 
This slim chance is not worth the damage it can do to the debtor by 
forcing him out of his home, reasoned the court correctly.
230
  
The Folendore court did fail to recognize another deleterious 
effect of the preservation of the junior lien. If the preservation of 
the junior lien causes the debtor to abandon the home, the debtor 
will not reaffirm the debt to the senior lienholder. This senior 
lienholder will then have to foreclose on the abandoned property 
and sustain a greater loss than it would have in a negotiated 
reaffirmation agreement. Property law has a priority system for 
security interests so as to prevent the junior lienholder from 
harming the senior lienholder.
231
 Further, the junior lienholder who 
keeps his lien under Laskin, Ryan, and Talbert only gets the chance 
at future attachment to equity in the home.
232
 But preserving this 
                                                          
225
Id. 
226
Id. 
227
Id. 
228
See id.   
229
See id. 
230
Id. 
231
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819–20. 
232
Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“By the time of sale in the future, a piece of real estate may have 
increased in value to cover a second-mortgage lien not covered by the property’s 
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chance comes at the expense of the present interests of the senior 
lienholder. It is unfair to preserve the future opportunity of the 
junior lienholder at the present expense of the more senior 
lienholder when the senior lienholder has a lot to lose (the debtor 
abandoning the home and the loss of a foreclosure sale) and the 
junior lienholder’s chance at future equity is so slim. 
 
D. The Debtor Needs a Chance at Future Home Equity 
 
Dewsnup prohibits strip downs because they deprive the under-
secured lienholder of potential future home equity.
233
 Laskin, 
Ryan, and Talbert prohibit strip off for the same reason because it 
deprives the unsecured lienholder of potential future equity.
234
 
However, the debtor’s need for future home equity outweighs the 
lienholder’s right for a chance at future home equity. After all, the 
goal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy “is to disencumber the future to 
provide debtors a fresh start.”235 The debtor should have the 
opportunity to keep his home after the bankruptcy and, if possible, 
acquire equity in the home without fearing a junior lienholder who 
waits to attach to that equity. In the case of our debtor, he should 
get a real fresh start. He should be able to sell his home if it 
increases in value and use the equity generated to improve his 
financial position. This is better policy than denying strip off, 
which results in either (1) the debtor abandoning his home; or (2) 
the debtor remaining in his home but losing out on any potential 
equity he is able to generate.
236
 
The courts that prohibit strip offs focus on the rights of an 
unsecured lienholder as opposed to the value of the lien.
237
 After 
                                                          
value today.”) (citation omitted); see also Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network 
(In re Ryan), 253 F.3d 778, 783 (4th Cir. 2001); Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
233
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). 
234
In re Talbert, 344 F.3d at 561; see also In re Ryan, 253 F.3d at 783; In 
re Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876. 
235
Henderson, supra note 26, at 136. 
236
See In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989). 
237
See In re Talbert, 344 F.3d at 561; In re Ryan, 253 F.3d at 783 (noting 
that protecting the lienholder’s interest in full post-bankruptcy applies to a strip 
off situation); In re Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876. 
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all, the junior lienholder in our example holds a claim unsecured 
by value in the home. This claim is, at present, valueless. To 
prohibit strip off, then, is to change the focus of bankruptcy from 
providing the debtor a fresh start to protecting the rights and 
possible future profits of creditors. 
A bankruptcy court should evaluate a junior lien in light of the 
importance of the debtor’s fresh start and the bleak outlook of the 
lienholder’s economic position. Viewing a strip off through the 
economic realities of the parties outweighs viewing the junior lien 
from the perspective of the lienholder’s in rem rights. In fact, as 
Professor Margaret Howard points out in her critique of the 
Dewsnup decision, protection of a creditor’s in rem rights has not 
been the focus of bankruptcy since the bankruptcy courts were 
created in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
238
  Howard traces the 
history of pre-Code opinions and criticizes the Dewsnup Court for 
erroneously construing bankruptcy law as a system that protects of 
the rights of secured creditors.
239
 Howard claims that both pre-
Code bankruptcy law and “the Code [itself] shift[] focus away 
from in rem rights towards protection of the value of those 
rights . . . .”240 To focus on respecting the rights of a secured 
creditor, without regard to the value of those rights, ignores the 
fact that “[t]he history of bankruptcy law shows a steady alteration 
of the rights of secured creditors, undertaken for the purposes of 
achieving equality of distribution and assuring the debtor a fresh 
start.”241 Thus, according to Howard, bankruptcy has never served 
the purpose of sacrificing the debtor’s present needs in order to 
protect the post-petition rights of a secured creditor.
242
 Bankruptcy 
has always served to give the debtor a fresh start and distribute the 
debtor’s assets equitably.243  
In an article written shortly before Dewsnup, Professor Joann 
Henderson comments on bankruptcy policy and supports Howard’s 
                                                          
238
See Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. 
L. & PRAC. 513, 526–530 (1992) [hereinafter Howard, Dewsnupping]. 
239
Id. 
240
Id. at 528. 
241
Id. at 527. 
242
Id. at 526–30. 
243
Id. at 527. 
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assertions.
244
 Henderson argues that protecting secured creditors’ 
rights to future equity is the business of state law.
245
 But 
bankruptcy necessarily disrupts the rights of creditors in order to 
provide the debtor with a fresh start.
246
 Henderson states that, for 
example, a bankruptcy discharge serves to disrupt state law 
property rights.
247
 In other words, discharge alters a 
“nonbankruptcy entitlement.”248 A strip off would be another way 
to alter a nonbankruptcy entitlement. The junior lienholder would 
lose its lien and incur a loss, but the debtor would get to keep his 
home. The history of bankruptcy law has often had to choose the 
debtor’s fresh start over the disturbance of a lienholder’s rights,249 
and strip off would simply be another example of that trend. 
 
IV. STRIP OFF IN CHAPTER 13 
 
While Chapter 13 strip offs are not prohibited in any federal 
circuit, the Supreme Court prohibited Chapter 13 strip downs in 
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank in 1993.
250
  Since Nobleman, 
which only concerned strip downs, all Circuit Courts of Appeals 
and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels that have addressed the issue of 
strip offs in Chapter 13 filings have allowed them.
251
 These circuit 
                                                          
244
See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 26, at 155 (“[D]ebtor strip down is an 
important tool to protect bankruptcy goals and is consistent with other 
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
245
Id. at 135. 
246
Id. at 135–36. 
247
Id. at 143. 
248
Id. 
249
See Howard, Dewsnupping, supra note 238, at 527 (“The history of 
bankruptcy law shows a steady alteration of the rights of secured creditors, 
undertaken for the purposes of achieving equality of distribution and assuring 
the debtor a fresh start.”). 
250
Nobleman v. Am. Savs. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
251
Strip off in Chapter 13 has been allowed in several post-Nobleman 
circuit cases. See In re Pond, 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); In re McDonald, 
205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 293, 296 (5th Cir. 
2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2000). Strip off in 
Chapter 13 has been allowed in post-Nobleman Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
cases. See In re Mann, 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000); In re Lam, 211 
B.R. 36, 40–41 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). 
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court cases reveal strong policy reasons to allow strip off.
252
 This 
policy applies with equal force to strip off in Chapter 7 filings.  
In a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor may “modify the rights of 
holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a 
security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal 
residence . . . .”253 In other words, the debtor may strip down liens 
attached to his property. However, the right to strip down does not 
apply to all of the debtor’s property. The Supreme Court held in 
Nobleman that section 1322(b)(2) prohibited stripping down a lien 
attached to the debtor’s primary residence in Chapter 13.254 The 
Court focused on the language in section 1322(b)(2) protecting the 
“rights” of lienholders and held that strip down of an under-
secured lien would impermissibly modify those rights.
255
  
Justice Stevens wrote a short concurring opinion in Nobleman, 
which explained the legislative history behind section 
1322(b)(2).
256
 He noted that the provision intended to offer 
“favorable treatment to residential mortgagees . . . to encourage the 
flow of capital into the home lending market.”257 Justice Stevens 
explained that Congress intended to protect home lenders in 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy because such protection would enable these 
lenders to make loans more easily.
258
 
Justice Stevens’ concurrence and the appellate opinions on 
Chapter 13 strip off reveal strong policy reasons to allow strip off 
in Chapter 7. The first appellate court to address Chapter 13 strip 
off was the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in In 
re Lam.
259
 In In re Lam, the court distinguished strip off from the 
strip down in Nobleman.
260
 The court noted that the Nobleman 
prohibition of strip down served to protect the under-secured 
                                                          
252
See, e.g., In re Bartee, 212 F.3d at 293. 
253
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012). 
254
Nobleman v. Am. Savs. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993). 
255
Id. at 331–32. 
256
Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
257
Id. 
258
Id. 
259
See Lam v. Investors Thrift (In re Lam), 211 B.R. 36, 40–41 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1997). 
260
Id. at 41 (“The Nobleman decision . . . does not apply to holders of 
totally unsecured claims.”). 
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lienholder, not the unsecured lienholder.
261
 The court also 
described the economically untenable position of the unsecured 
lienholder:  
An analysis of the state law “rights” afforded a 
holder of an unsecured “lien”, if such a situation 
exists, indicates these rights are empty rights from a 
practical, if not, a legal standpoint. A forced sale of 
the property would not result in any financial return 
to the lienholder, even if a forced sale could be 
accomplished where the lien attaches to nothing. 
Nothing secures the “right” of the lienholder to 
continue to receive monthly installment payments, 
to retain the lien until the debt is paid off, or the 
right to accelerate the loan upon default, if there is 
no security available to the lienholder to foreclose 
on in the event the debtor fails to fulfill the contract 
payment obligations.
262
 
Thus, the Lam court stripped off the unsecured lien because the 
lienholder had, at the time of the bankruptcy, no real rights, as a 
practical matter.
263
 The Folendore court made the exact same point 
in the Chapter 7 strip off context.
264
 An unsecured lienholder does 
not have any enforceable rights unless the home increases in 
value.
265
  It is important to note that the Lam court, the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, subsequently denied Chapter 
7 strip off in Laskin.
266
 The Laskin opinion delves into the practical 
considerations in Lam because Laskin concludes that Dewsnup 
decided the issue of Chapter 7 strip off.
267
 Dewsnup does not 
necessarily prohibit strip off, though, as Dewsnup applied to a strip 
down situation. And the junior lienholder’s unfavorable position is 
the same whether a debtor is in Chapter 13 or Chapter 7. Other 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have agreed that strip off is permissible 
                                                          
261
Id. 
262
Id. at 40. 
263
Id. 
264
See In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989). 
265
Id. 
266
See In re Laskin, 222 B.R. 872 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
267
See id. at 876 (“Our holding that a strip off is prohibited in Chapter 7 . . 
. is consistent . . . with Dewsnup . . . .”). 
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in Chapter 13 cases.
268
  
The courts’ allowance of strip off has given additional weight 
to the policy concerns mentioned in Justice Stevens’ 
concurrence.
269
 Justice Stevens noted that Congress was concerned 
with giving home purchase lenders “favorable treatment” over 
home equity lenders.
270
 Home purchase lenders lend the money to 
purchase a home. Home equity lenders lend money for any 
purpose and take a security interest on a home already owned by 
the borrower.
271
 In our example, the home purchase lender has the 
senior mortgage of $200,000; its interest was the first on the 
property. The home equity lender is the junior lienholder. This 
lender lent our debtor $50,000 and took a security interest in the 
home subordinate to the senior home purchase lender. The Lam 
court noted that “because second mortgages are not in the business 
of lending money for home purchases, the same policy reasons for 
protection of first mortgages under [section] 1322(b)(2) do not 
exist for second mortgages.”272 The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, in In re McDonald, identified the purpose of section 
1322(b)(2) as promoting home-buying and home-building; 
homeowners typically do not use second mortgages for those 
purposes.
273
 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in In re 
Bartee, noted that “because secondary lending is targeted primarily 
at personal spending, allowing wholly undersecured second 
mortgages under the umbrella of [section 1322(b)(2)] would be 
unlikely to positively impact home building and buying.”274 The 
                                                          
268
Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 
2001); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d 
Cir. 2000); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 296 (5th Cir. 2000); Tanner v. First Plus 
Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Mann, 
249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).   
269
See, e.g., In re Lam, 211 B.R. at 41. 
270
See Nobleman v. Am. Savs. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
271
See Nacy, supra note 31, at 103 (describing the practices of home equity 
lenders). 
272
In re Lam, 211 B.R. at 41. 
273
See McDonald v. Master Fin. Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 613 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[S]econd mortgages are rarely used to purchase a home.”). 
274
In re Bartee, 212 F.3d at 293 (citation omitted). 
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court in Bartee also noted that many home equity loans are the 
result of predatory lending practices that do not deserve protection 
from strip off.
275
 Thus, second-mortgage lenders do not get 
protection from strip off in Chapter 13 because Congress favored 
home purchase mortgage lending over home equity lending and 
because home equity lenders often use predatory lending 
practices.
276
 
These same rationales apply with equal force to a Chapter 7 
strip off situation. Homeowners in Chapter 7 took out home equity 
loans not for home-buying but, rather, personal spending.
277
 There 
is no reason why home equity lenders should have greater 
protection in Chapter 7 than in Chapter 13.  Allowing strip off in 
Chapter 7 would promote home-buying and home-building, just as 
Chapter 13 strip off promotes home-buying and home-building. 
Further, it is in the best financial interest of the senior lienholder if 
a Chapter 7 debtor is able to retain his home, because then the 
senior lienholder avoids the loss incurred by the foreclosure sale.
278
 
Allowing strip off in a Chapter 7 case increases the likelihood that 
a Chapter 7 debtor retains his home and the senior lienholder 
avoids that loss.
279
 Denial of strip off may actually hurt the senior 
lienholder since the debtor may choose to abandon his home 
because the junior lien will encumber it post-bankruptcy.
280
   
Also, many of the junior liens currently encumbering homes 
are the product of predatory or bad lending practices.
281
 The home 
equity lending market was full of irresponsible lending practices in 
                                                          
275
Id. (discussing Jane Kaufman Winn, Lien Stripping After Nobelman, 27 
LOY. L. REV. 541, 584 (1994)). 
276
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit affirmed the 
concerns expressed by the Lam court, the McDonald court, and the Bartee court 
regarding the policy underlying 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012). In re Mann, 249 
B.R. 831, 839–40 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000). 
277
In re Bartee, 212 F.3d at 293. 
278
See, e.g., Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Folendore) 862 
F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989). 
279
See, e.g., id. 
280
See id. (noting that denial of strip off gives the debtor incentive to 
abandon the property, which would force the senior lender to foreclose and incur 
losses). 
281
See House of Cards, supra note 7. 
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the early 2000s.
282
 These shady lending practices contributed to 
many of the unsecured junior liens currently encumbering 
American homes.
283
 Thus, the reasons to allow strip off in Chapter 
13 apply to Chapter 7.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Implementing a Chapter 7 strip off provision would help the 
current housing crisis. A debtor could more easily retain his home 
because he would have only one lienholder with which to reaffirm 
debt. Also, the junior lienholder holds a lien that, at the time of the 
bankruptcy, is worthless. This lien may increase in value, and a 
strip off eliminates a junior lienholder’s chance at that increase, but 
this chance is slim, and the debtor’s need to retain his home 
outweighs providing a junior lienholder with a slim chance at 
avoiding a loss. Finally, Chapter 7 debtors should have the same 
right to strip off that Chapter 13 debtors get, because Chapter 7 
strip off would, as it does in Chapter 13, favor home purchase 
lenders over home equity lenders. Thus, Congress should amend 
the Bankruptcy Code so that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off the 
lien attached to the debtor’s home of a junior, unsecured 
lienholder.  
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